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The Birth of a Province
On January 23, 2000, about thirty thousand ethnic Gorontalo from all over the 
Indonesian archipelago gathered at the local stadium in Gorontalo City. They were 
there to celebrate "Hari Patriotik, 23 Januari 1942." Patriot Day commemorates local 
hero Nani Wartabone and the anticolonial rebellion he led that ousted the Dutch from 
the region. On that fateful day in January, Wartabone famously declared Gorontalo 
"free from colonialism."* 1
As a practical matter, Gorontalo would endure Japan's brutal wartime occupation 
as well as Dutch attempts to return to the archipelago after World War II. But the 
Gorontalo are fiercely proud of Wartabone's words, often noting that they were the 
first in Indonesia to declare independence, well ahead of Sukarno's declaration in 
August of 1945.2 The story of January 1942 is therefore one woven into the larger
’ This article is based on fieldwork conducted in North Sulawesi and Gorontalo over several trips during 
2004-2005. The author would like to thank Eunsook Jung, Amelia Liwe, Jennifer Munger, Basri Amin,
Paul Hutchcroft, Donald Emmerson, and an anonymous reviewer at Indonesia for comments that helped to 
improve the article. Remaining errors are the author's alone.
1 Alim Niode and Husein Mohi, Abad Besar Gorontalo (Gorontalo: Presnas Publishing, 2003), p. 38.
2 This fact was recounted to me in numerous conversations with informants in Gorontalo. This discourse 
was also evident in the local media; for example, see newspaper accounts such as "Gorontalo Jumat 1942 
Terulang," Harian Gorontalo, October 21, 2000.
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tapestry of Indonesia's nationalist struggle. The annual event is performed complete 
with the raising of the merah putih (Indonesia's "red-white" national flag), singing of 
the Indonesia Raya, and speeches by government dignitaries.
But the ceremony in 2000 had a slightly different tone. The crowd was larger than 
in other years, a buzz filled the air, and many of the attendees wore traditional 
Gorontalo dress. When the official ceremony ended, a new group of speakers took the 
stage. These were leaders of P4GTR3 and PRESNAS,4 two leading organizations 
advocating the creation of a new Gorontalo province.
Addressing the large crowd at the stadium, H. Natzir Mooduto, a key organizer of 
the new-province movement, recalled Wartabone's famous words and continued, 
"Fifty-eight years later to the day, on this Sunday 23 January 2000, we, all the people of 
Gorontalo, whether inside or outside the region, declare the formation of Gorontalo 
Province!"5 A few moments later, Nelson Pomalingo, another leading figure, 
underscored Mooduto's words: "With the blessing of Allah all powerful, on this day, 
the 23rd of January 2000 that is honored by the January 23 Patriotic Movement, we 
officially declare the separation of Gorontalo Tomini Raya!"6
If one resisted the excitement and emotion, this might have appeared a slightly 
awkward moment. New provinces cannot simply be declared into existence. They 
require extensive bureaucratic scrutiny at multiple levels of government, capped by 
legislation passed in Jakarta. Though a lobbying process was already underway to 
establish Gorontalo Province, such a bold pronouncement entailed considerable risk. 
But like Wartabone's declaration in 1942, the statement of provincial independence 
proved prescient, if premature. Less than a year later, Gorontalo did succeed in its 
aspirations.7 A new province called Gorontalo, mostly Muslim and ethnically 
Gorontalo, split away from North Sulawesi Province, which had a Christian majority 
and was multiethnic.
Why were the Gorontalo so anxious to form their own province? And how did they 
achieve their objective so quickly? I argue that, historically, state formation and 
centralization divided—rather than unified—different groups in North Sulawesi, 
creating a situation I call "marginality in the periphery." By this I mean that, while 
North Sulawesi region as a whole has historically been a peripheral area in the national 
context, stark differences in power relations evolved within the province such that 
some groups dominated and others felt marginalized.
With the foundations for this argument in place, I will also argue that the timing 
and success of the new-province movement can be attributed to Indonesia's political
3 Panitia Persiapan Pembentukan Provinsi Gorontalo Tomini Raya, or Committee to Prepare for the 
Separation of Gorontalo Tomini Raya Province.
4 Presidium Nasional Pembentukan Provinsi Gorontalo, or National Presidium for the Formation of 
Gorontalo Province.
5 Hardil Nurdin, Sang Dekarator (Gorontalo: Presnas Press, 2000), p. 77.
6 Ibid., p. 80.
7 Law Number 38 was passed on December 4, 2000; the official declaration of provincehood occurred on 
February 16, 2001. See Hasanuddin, Buhanudin Domili, and Sri Suharjo, Otonomi Daerah dan Pengaruhnya 
Terhadap Pemekaran Wilayah Serta Menguatnya Kesadaran Etnis Di Provinsi Gorontalo (Manado, Indonesia: 
Kementerian Kebudayaan dan Pariwista, Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional Manado, 2004).
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transition. A weakened state and institutional changes affected the situation at a key 
juncture, when a variety of actors at the local, regional, and national level developed an 
interest in seeing through the creation of a Gorontalo province. Together, the historical 
and more contemporary narratives explain why a new-province movement in 
Gorontalo emerged and why its advocates were successful.
Gorontalo's experience is not unique. Since 1999, six other regions have also split 
off from their mother provinces to become independent; these include West Papua, 
North Maluku, Banten, Bangka-Belitung, the Riau Islands, and West Sulawesi.8 Many 
other regions are in the process of trying to institute new provinces. Furthermore, 
many other new administrative units at the district, subdistrict, and village levels are 
being established at the same time.9 While this article does not attempt to explain all 
new-province formation in Indonesia, it does argue against two strands of thinking 
regarding the phenomenon.
First, the process is not simply being undertaken in the interests of administrative 
efficiency, as many policymakers and public officials at both the national and local 
levels claim.10 Bureaucrats and local executives often state that their own newly created 
district or province was necessary in order to bring local government closer to the 
people, and the people closer to the government. While efficiency may have been 
enhanced in some cases, these claims also tend to obscure politics and confer 
legitimacy on a process that is otherwise dubious.11 The phenomenon of new-province 
formation needs to be seen as a profoundly political process, undertaken by actors with 
clear political and economic interests at the local, regional, and national levels. This 
article seeks to identify those interests and the process by which they changed or 
emerged in Gorontalo.
Nor should this trend toward new-province formation be understood as a general 
movement seeking regional autonomy in the conventional sense. Much of the 
scholarship concerning regionalism and territoriality in Indonesia has typically 
emphasized the ways in which regions press for autonomy from the national state, in 
places such as East Timor, West Papua, and Aceh.12 This approach tends to obscure the
8 See Ehito Kimura, "Provincial Proliferation: Vertical Coalitions and the Politics of Territoriality in Post- 
Authoritarian Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 2006) to see the 
corresponding mother province for each of these new entities, the law, and the year each newly 
established province was made official.
9 See, for example Fitria Fitrani, Bert Hofman, and Kai Kaiser, "Unity in Diversity? The Creation of New 
Local Governments in a Decentralizing Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 41,1 (2005): 57- 
79.
10 For example, at the national level, interviews with Ferry Mursyidan Baldan, chairman Commission II of 
the Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, June 3, 2005; and Suparman, head of Technical 
Commission on Regional Autonomy, Association of Indonesian Regency Government, Jakarta, May 25, 
2005. At the local level, interviews with Edwin Silangen, Interim District Chief, North Minahasa, Manado, 
March 29, 2005; A. G. Kawatu, interim bupati, North Minahasa, April 1, 2005; Abit Takalingan, Provincial 
Parliament member, Northern Sulawesi, Manado, April 2, 2005. Interviews with government officials in 
North Sulawesi and Gorontalo in 2005.
11 See James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in 
Lesotho (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).
12 See, for example, Octavianus Mote and Danilyn Rutherford, "From Irian Jaya to Papua: The Limits of 
Primordialism in Indonesia's Troubled East," Indonesia 71 (October 2001): 115-139; Douglas Kammen, 
"The Trouble With Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution to East Timor," 
in Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia, ed. Benedict Anderson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia
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diverse and complex political interactions that occur within those regions among social 
groups and political elites. And separatism in Indonesia, though critical in the context 
of state resilience, is arguably an exceptional phenomenon primarily limited to the 
three cases noted above. Regional proliferation is a far more common and widespread 
trend than is separatism in Indonesia.
Furthermore, this article argues that examining the proliferation of provinces tells 
us important things about regional politics, particularly about the alliances and 
cooperation that take place within and between regions and centers, in a way that 
focusing on separatism does not. The literature on separatism is rooted in the 
assumption that conflict occurs between two unitary actors—center and periphery— 
engaged in a zero-sum game.13 The experience in North Sulawesi illustrates that 
regionalist aspirations in the so-called "periphery" can actually be "positive-sum." The 
gain of one side (advocates for a new province) may not necessarily mean a loss for the 
other (the central government). Instead, center and periphery can be seen to be 
composed of a variety of groups, such that each time a new province is formed, the 
result may be mutually beneficial to groups at both the center and the region.
The following section highlights North Sulawesi's diversity, noting how the 
province has been compartmentalized according to religion, ethnicity, and territory. 
The article then shows how attempts to incorporate North Sulawesi into the state 
formed the basis for an imbalance of power among different groups, and it examines 
Indonesia's political crisis of 1998 and the way democratization and decentralization 
reforms triggered the movement to create new provinces. Finally, it addresses how the 
interests of political elites converged with those of various societal groups, facilitating 
the establishment of Gorontalo province.
Compartmentalized Diversity in North Sulawesi
Located on the northern tip of Sulawesi Island, North Sulawesi Province is remote, 
geographically closer to Manila than to Jakarta. It is also a highly diverse region with a 
population consisting of half a dozen ethnic groups split evenly between Christians 
and Muslims. Before the province was divided, in 2000, its population hovered at 
around three million, divided roughly into six major ethnic groups: the Minahasa, 
Gorontalo, Bolaang-Mongondow, Sangir, Talaud, and Javanese (see Table l).14
Program Publications, 2001); Geoffrey Robinson, "Rowan is as Rowan Does: The Origins of Disorder in 
New Order Aceh," in Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia; and Mark Berger and Edward Aspinall, 
"The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonisation and the Limits of the Nation-state in Post- 
Cold War Southeast Asia," Third World Quarterly 22,6 (December 2001): 1003-1024.
13 The classic literature on center-periphery relations here includes Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: 
Essays in Macro Sociology (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1975); and Michael Hechter, Internal 
Colonialism: The Celtic Tringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1975).
14 It is important to note that these identities are malleable and often complicated by subethnic identities as 
well. For example, there are several languages in Minahasa that correlate to some eight different subethnic 
groups. See, for example, Reimar Schefold, ed., Minahasa Past and Present: Tradition and Transition in an 
Outer Island Region of Indonesia (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1995). See also, H. B. Palar and L. A. Anes, 
Minahasa: Sejarah dan Derap Langkahnya Menuju Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Manado, Indonesia: PT Tarsius, 
1994). These authors argue that these "subethnic" groups consolidated over the years in order to counter
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Table 1. Ethnic Groups in North Sulawesi Province in 2000
Name Population Percent
Gorontalo 897,235 33%
Minahasa 824,700 29%
Sangir 396,810 14%
Bolaang-Mongondow 224,749 8%
Talaud 79,838 3%
Javanese 64,619 2%
Other 314,735 11%
Total 2,802,686 100%
Source: BPS 200015
Administratively, the province consisted of four districts, or kabupaten—Minahasa, 
Gorontalo, Sangir-Talaud, and Bolaang-Mongondow—and encompassed three cities— 
Gorontalo, Manado, and Bitung.15 6 17Gorontalo, located in the southwestern portion of the 
province, occupied the largest land area. Bolaang-Mongondow lay to its northeast. 
Minahasa district occupied the northern tip of Sulawesi. And Sangir and Talaud, two 
island groups classified as one district, were neighboring islands located north of the 
mainland and due south of the Philippines.
Table 2. Kabupatens and Kotas in North Sulawesi
Name Square Kilometers Percent of Area
Gorontalo 12,150.65 44%
Bolaang-Mongondow 8,358.04 31 %
Minahasa 4,188.94 15%
Sangir Talaud 2,263.95 8.25%
Gorontalo City 64.8 0.25%
Manado City 157.25 0.5%
Bitung City 304.00 1 %
Total 27,487.63 100%
Source: BPS 200017
In 2000, about half of the region's population was Christian, with most residing in 
the northern area of Minahasa, and Sangir-Talaud. This was the result of an effective 
proselytizing campaign conducted by Dutch missionaries in the nineteenth century. To 
the south and west, the Gorontalo ethnic group and a majority of the Bolaang- 
Mongondow remained staunchly Muslim. Islam had made its way to Gorontalo and 
Bolaang-Mongondow in the sixteenth century thanks to the influence of the 
neighboring Ternate Sultanate, and later, in the early seventeenth century, it had 
radiated from the south with the rise of the Kingdom of Gowa. The Christianizing
domination from a neighboring kingdom, the Bolaang-Mongondow.
15 Compiled from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), Penduduk Sulawesi Utara, Hasil Sensus Penduduk Tahun 
2000, Seri: L2.2.23 (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2000).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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influence of the Dutch missionaries did not reach down to Gorontalo, in part because 
the Dutch did not have a strong presence in the area.
Table 3. Religion in North Sulawesi Province
Name Number Percent
Islam 1,396,513 50%
Protestant 1,285,588 46%
Catholic 93,678 3%
Hindu 11,606 0.5%
Buddhist 3,981 0.1 %
Other 12,258 0.4%
Total 2,803,624 100%
Source: BPS 200018
These demographic patterns do not only highlight the diversity in the region. They 
also illustrate the way in which ethnic identity and territory correspond closely with 
one another. This correspondence—or compartmentalization—provided an important 
precondition that facilitated the breakup of North Sulawesi province. 
Compartmentalization should be understood as more than just the clustering or 
concentration of different groups in close proximity to one another. It refers to the 
particular way in which different groups are brought together under the same 
overarching territorial institutions (in this case, the province) by the state.
Most ethnic groups in the region formed a majority population in their own 
districts; only in urban areas, such as the provincial capital of Manado, was this not 
true. Thus, each of the sizable ethnic groups arguably had its own "homeland." Circa 
2000, the Gorontalo could be characterized as an ethnic group with most of its 
members living in the district of the same name, where most people adhered to Islam. 
This kind of correspondence between ethnicity, religion, and territory made it easy, 
when the time came, for advocates to highlight the differences among groups in the 
region and claim the right to "upgrade" the territory, from, say, a district to a 
province.18 9
To be sure, compartmentalization alone cannot fully explain why certain provinces 
split apart. Many provinces throughout Indonesia have multiple ethnic or religious 
groups occupying a single administrative region, and most have remained intact. The 
process by which territorial administration in North Sulawesi has historically been 
carried out is also critical to understanding group relations in the region and 
explaining the impetus toward the formation of a separate Gorontalo province.
18 Ibid.
19 Upgrading inside existing boundaries would be easier than creating a new province with new 
administrative boundaries. In North Sulawesi, other initiatives for the formation of new provinces and 
new districts were also often justified along ethnic or sub-ethnic lines in ways that overlapped with 
territory. For example, in the wake of Gorontalo's success, there has been an emerging movement for a 
Bolaang-Mongondow province emerging from people living in that district. At the district level, too, 
Minahasa was divided into three different districts: Minahasa, North Minahasa, and South Minahasa, 
again along sub-ethnic lines
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The Historical Foundations of Privilege and Marginality
In North Sulawesi, the historical process of state building created economic and 
political imbalances between different groups in the region. Specifically, state practices 
historically privileged the ethnic Minahasa at the expense of the ethnic Gorontalo. The 
movement for a new Gorontalo province emerged from this feeling of marginalization 
experienced by the Gorontalo within the original province. In this sense, while North 
Sulawesi itself is often included as part of Indonesia's Outer Island "periphery," this 
article highlights the power dynamics of privilege and marginality within that 
periphery.20
Four key periods of state formation in North Sulawesi are particularly instructive 
in highlighting the development of these intra-regional relations: the colonial period, 
the nationalist period, the era of regional rebellion, and the New Order era. Each shows 
how attempts by the state (both colonial and Indonesian) to consolidate power and 
incorporate the region into a larger territorial entity served to create a fragile and 
internally fragmented province.
Colonial Interventions and Legacies
Though group identities in North Sulawesi predate colonialism, European 
intervention in the region influenced group relations in three fundamental ways. First, 
colonialism introduced the practice of territorial administration into the region. 
Second, Dutch missionaries actively transformed regional identity by converting large 
numbers of people to Christianity. And third, the colonial administration actively 
privileged one group, the Minahasa, above others in the region.
One distinctive characteristic of precolonial Indonesia was its relative abundance of 
land and shortage of labor.21 A high land-to-labor ratio meant that the precolonial 
kingdoms on Java and elsewhere tended to be more interested in people than in 
territory. Labor, particularly in the context of agricultural cultivation, was critical to the 
growth and survival of these kingdoms. Wars were thus less often about securing 
territory than about capturing populations who could be brought back to the home city 
of the victors and put to work.
Political affinities in North Sulawesi prior to the Europeans' arrival also tended to 
be aterritorial.22 Locals aligned themselves with sovereigns or rajas rather than 
identifying themselves with a piece of land. For example, different members of a single 
village might have been loyal to different rulers despite living next door to one 
another. But the Dutch arrived in the region in the seventeenth century intent on 
securing territory in order to harvest rice for troops in the Moluccas.23This plan proved 
a threat to the Bolaang-Amurang-Manado raja based to the south and west of the
20 Anna Tsing formulates this notion more eloquently as "out-of-the-way," albeit in a different context in 
her aptly titled book. See Anna Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way 
Place (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
21 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).
22 See David Henley, Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the Dutch East Indies 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), p. 29.
23 Ibid., p. 31.
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region, and he launched periodic attacks against the Dutch. The Dutch then fortified 
their territory in the north and established clear boundaries, which they stipulated in 
treaties and enforced with troops.24
Initially, the Dutch East Indies Company had dealt with Gorontalo indirectly from 
their post in Ternate. Once they had established clear boundaries, however, the Dutch 
entered the Gorontalo region in the early 1700s and set up a trading post.25 In the 1730s, 
the governor-general of Maluku concluded an agreement with the king of Gorontalo to 
build a residence for the representative of the Dutch East Indies Company in 
Gorontalo.26 But the company's hold on the area remained tenuous at best, forcing it to 
withdraw its forces periodically.
Nearly a century later, in 1824, the Dutch East Indies Company separated 
Gorontalo from the residency of Ternate and appended it to the residency of Manado.27 
Thus, for the first time, the Minahasa and the Gorontalo populations were governed by 
the same administrative structure. The Manado residency was composed of two large 
sections: the Minahasa region, including Manado and various small kingdoms in the 
west and south, and the kingdoms of Gorontalo, Limboto, and others in Teluk 
Tomini.28The islands of Sangir and Talaud, in the waters to the north of the region, 
were added a short time later.29
By the late nineteenth century, the Dutch had territorially consolidated North 
Sulawesi into four regions: Minahasa; the areas to the north and west of Minahasa; the 
areas along the Southern Coast of Teluk Tomini; and the islands of Sangihe Talaud.30 
The Dutch residency was headquartered in Manado, while assistant s to the residents 
were stationed in Gorontalo and the other administrative regions.31 This structure of 
administration would form the basis for the modern North Sulawesi Province.
Beyond introducing the practice of territoriality and territorial administration, the 
Dutch also brought Christianity to the region on a large scale. In the 1820s, two Dutch 
missionaries from the Calvinist organization, the Netherlands Missionary Society 
(Nederlandse Zending Genootschap, or NZG) conducted a mass campaign to convert 
the local residents to Christianity.32 Conversion in the region accomplished two things. 
First, it created additional cultural markers to distinguish groups in the area. Because 
most of the missionary work took place among the Minahasa, where the Dutch had 
established a strong presence, Christianity would be concentrated in the north. By the 
1880s, over 75 percent of Minahasans were converted to Christianity, leading some 
contemporaries to reflect that the experience was "unequaled in the history of
24 Ibid., p. 32.
25 Niode and Mohi, Abad Besar Gorontalo, p. 33.
26 Ibid.
27 Hasanuddin, Gorontalo Tantangan dan Kebijakan Sosial, Politik & Ekonomi Kolonial Belanda (Gorontalo: Balai 
Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional Manado, 2004), p. 63.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid..
31 Ibid., p. 64.
32 Henley, Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context, p. 6.
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Christian missions."33 Meanwhile, most other groups in the region, including the 
Gorontalo, were not converted.
Second, Christianity among the Minahasa served to exacerbate inequality among 
different groups in the region. In addition to proselytizing, Christian missionaries also 
sought to educate the "indigenous masses." While most schools were initially 
concentrated in the immediate area where Dutch missionaries worked, their influence 
slowly spread to the broader Minahasa region. Only a small number of these schools 
were exclusively religious institutions, but the Dutch invested heavily in general 
education throughout the area and often recruited the help of missionary teachers for 
secular schools. By the turn of the twentieth century, residents in the Minahasa area 
had become one of the most educated Native groups in all the Dutch East Indies. In the 
1930 census, Minahasa had the highest literacy rate in the entire archipelago.34 Of 539 
government-run schools in the Dutch East Indies, 74 were found in Minahasa.35 This 
combination of education and Christianity proffered high status to Minahasans in the 
colonial order,36 where they were given priority in the KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch- 
Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands-Indies Army), the bureaucracy, and other 
government positions.37
Even prior to the mass Christian conversion in this territory, the overwhelming 
presence of the Dutch in the Minahasa region often led indigenous elites to ally with 
the colonial regime in order to improve their own social standing. For example, in 
military recruitment, Minahasans made up a disproportionately large part of the 
colonial army. From 1825 to 1830, the Dutch faced a strong rebellion on Java led by 
Prince Diponegoro. To counter Diponegoro's forces, the Dutch recruited from their 
various strongholds such as Bali, Ternate, and Makassar. In Manado, the Dutch were 
able to recruit 1,400 soldiers out of a population of roughly 80,000.38
Colonialism thus laid the foundations for future relationships among ethnic groups 
in North Sulawesi. Colonial treaties demarcated the region territorially and dictated 
who would be included in it. Dutch practices also shaped identity, particularly among 
the Minahasa in the north through religious conversion. And finally, colonialism 
distributed power unevenly in the region in such a way that the Minahasa gained a 
disproportionate share of social, political, and economic benefits under the colonial 
system.
33 Gerry van Klinken, Minorities, Modernity, and the Emerging Nation Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical 
Approach (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), p. 86.
34 See Helmut Buchholt, "The Impact of the Christian Mission on Processes of Social Differentiation," in 
Continuity, Change, and Aspirations: Social and Cultural Life in Minahasa, Indonesia, ed. Helmut Buchholt and 
Ulrich Mai (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994).
35 Richard Leirissa, "Dynamics of the History of Minahasa," in Minahasa Past and Present.
36 See ibid. It would also give other Christian-educated groups like the Ambonese similar benefits.
37 Ibid.
38 In contrast, only 150 soldiers from Gorontalo were recruited and participated in the Java war. See Mieke 
Schouten, Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677-1983 (Leiden: KITLV, 
1998).
80 Ehito Kimura
Divergent Nationalisms
If colonialism sowed the seeds of emerging differences and inequality in North 
Sulawesi, nationalism might have been expected to ease them. A common enemy often 
forces groups to set aside their differences. However, the nationalist experiences of the 
Minahasa and Gorontalo diverged during this period, in part due to their respective 
colonial relationships with the Dutch. The Minahasa viewed nationalism through the 
lens of their special colonial status, making their support of the budding Indonesian 
independence movement more complex and conditional than it was in Gorontalo.
In the early twentieth century, at least three different models of Minahasa's 
political future stood side by side. One model advocated for Minahasan integration 
into the Dutch Republic as its twelfth province (Twaalfde Provincie).39 Others, such as 
supporters of the Perserikatan Minahasa, pushed for more autonomy and, ultimately, 
national independence.40 But by the 1920s, considerable communication between the 
Minahasa and other groups in the Dutch East Indies led to a growing sentiment for the 
third model: pan-archipelagic, Indonesian nationalism. Leaders such as Sam 
Ratulangie thus attempted to straddle Indonesian and Minahasan nationalist 
interests.41 Intent on preserving Minahasan volk identity, with the long-term goal of 
establishing an independent nation-state, Ratulangie ultimately compromised by 
agreeing to a federal model for the Indonesian state that would give states a great deal 
of autonomy.42All of these experiences served to make Minahasans conscious and self- 
aware of their own identity during the nationalist period. Notably, each model sought 
to highlight and institutionally preserve Minahasan identity and privilege in one form 
or another.
In contrast, the ethnic Gorontalo faced fewer internal dilemmas when responding 
to the archipelago's nationalist experience. Leaders, including Nani Wartabone, had 
studied on Java, attending schools such as MULO (Meer Uitgebreide Lagere 
Onderwijs, or Extended Elementary Education) in Surabaya, and mixing with other 
future nationalist leaders from Java. In 1923, Wartabone pushed to establish Jong 
Gorontalo, a branch of a national youth organization, and in 1928, he also established 
the local office for the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party).43 
When PNI disbanded in 1931, it was replaced by Partai Indonesia (Partindo), and a 
new branch was established in the region with many of the same PNI leaders and 
organizers in place.44
PNI and Partindo were secular nationalist organizations, but Islam also played a 
key role in the nationalist movement in Gorontalo. By this time, Sarekat Islam, an 
Islamic political party, had reached Gorontalo, having been introduced into the region 
by the 1923 visit from H. Umar Said Cokroaminoto, leader of the organization. 
Cokroaminoto and others saw Islam as a way of opposing Dutch colonialism and
39 Henley, Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context, p. 154.
40 Ibid.
41 Leirissa, "Dynamics of the History of Minahasa," p. 101.
42 Henley, Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context, p. 132.
43 Hasanuddin, Gorontalo Tantangan dan Kebijakan Sosial, Politik & Ekonomi Kolonial Belanda, p. 158.
44 Ibid., p. 159.
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forming the basis for national pride. In 1928, Sarekat Islam officially opened a branch 
office in Gorontalo.45
For these reasons, the Gorontalo did not harbor pro-Dutch sentiments nor have 
clear aspirations for independent statehood in the way the Minahasa did. Their 
experiences embedded them firmly in the nationalist struggle and strengthened their 
desire to throw out the Dutch occupiers. Note the explicitly nationalist message in this 
statement made by Nani Wartabone on Patriot Day in 1942:
Pada hari ini tanggal 23 Januari 1942, kita, bangsa Indonesia yang berada di sini, 
sudah merdeka, bebas lepas dari penjajahan bangsa mana pun juga. Bendera kita 
Merah Putih. Lagu kebangsaan adalah Indonesia Raya.46
Only World War II and the experience of Japan's brutal occupation began to bring 
the Minahasa and Gorontalo into the same Indonesian nationalist fold. The Dutch had 
made some effort to suppress notions of Indonesian nationalism, but when Japanese 
troops invaded, they forced their way into houses with bayonets and demanded to 
know whether occupants were "Dutch or Indonesian?," to which the only safe 
response was, "Indonesian."47 This meant that, for the first time, a pan-archipelagic 
nationalism would be embedded in North Sulawesi, with the Minahasans and the 
Gorontalo expressing similar aspirations and nationalist goals.
A Lonely Rebellion
The Japanese occupation ended in 1945, after which the Dutch attempted to retain 
power over Indonesia. Those attempts ultimately failed, and in 1949 the Dutch granted 
Indonesia sovereignty. The different groups in North Sulawesi jointly opposed Dutch 
attempts to regain a foothold in the former colony. In order to fight the returning 
Dutch forces in Northern Sulawesi, reinforcements were sent from other regions, 
including Makassar.48 But by the end of the 1950s, the rise of regional rebellions put the 
Minahasa on a different trajectory from its local neighbors yet again. Whatever affinity 
the Minahasa and Gorontalo felt in their shared opposition to the Japanese and the 
Dutch in the 1940s was largely shattered in the post-independence era.
From 1958 to 1961, North Sulawesi waged war against the central government in 
what became known as Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta, or "General Struggle"). The 
rebellion began as a reaction against the perceived over-centralization of the 
Indonesian state, and particularly its "Java-centric" focus, imposed at the expense of 
the archipelago's "Outer Islands." Leaders cited the economic imbalance and, in 
particular, Jakarta's restrictions on the export of natural resources. The military officers 
in the region had a substantial stake in commodities such as coconut (copra, the dried 
kernel of the coconut) and wanted to export it abroad at the international market price.
45 Ibid., p. 154.
46 Alim Niode and Husein Mohi, Abad Besar Gorontalo, p. 38. "On this day, January 23,1942, we, the people 
of Indonesia, living here, are independent, free from colonialism by any nation whatsoever. Our flag is the 
Red and White. Our national anthem is Indonesia Raya.
47 Henley, Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context, p. 150.
48 Alim Niode, Gorontalo: Perubahan Nilai-Nilai Budaya, Pranata Sosial dan Ideologi Lokal (Gorontalo: Yayasan 
Pohalaa and Media Pustaka, 2002), p. 68.
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But Jakarta maintained a monopoly on the commodity and required Indonesia's 
"Outer Islands" to sell their commodities to Java at slightly above half the international 
price, thereby infuriating regional producers.49
Initially, Permesta was based out of Makassar in southern Sulawesi and consisted 
of a relatively broad coalition of dissatisfied Outer Island officers.50 But in independent 
consultations, officers in the south decided to negotiate with the central government 
and quickly reached a settlement.51 The officers from North Sulawesi, largely 
Minahasan, were not satisfied with the terms of negotiation and opted to fight.
The Minahasa in North Sulawesi proved to be the most determined combatants in 
the Permesta rebellion, in large part because they had the most at stake. Since they 
were Christian, and economically better off, they also made up a disproportionate 
percentage of the military. But those very characteristics also made them the object of 
resentment regionally, and thus the Minahasa received little support from their 
neighbors after government retaliation began. Permesta thus became a Minahasan 
problem.52Though initially successful in confronting the central government's military 
force, Permesta quickly collapsed once the central government captured Manado 
through aerial bombardment and the dispatch of army troops.
Even a cursory study of Permesta brings the experiences of the Gorontalo and the 
Minahasans into sharp relief. Narratives in Gorontalo emphasize how the people of 
Gorontalo opposed Permesta. The nationalist Nani Wartabone took part in resisting 
this rebel movement, declaring that "we did not recognize PRRI / Permesta as a part of 
the Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic." Wartabone joined with battalion 512 and 
a detachment of battalion 715 Hasanuddin and led a sweep of Gorontalo to clear the 
region from the threat of Permesta, a feat accomplished by 1958.53
Permesta proved a defining moment in the history of the region. It not only 
affected relations between the Minahasa and the central government, it also served to 
further distance the Minahasa from the other groups in North Sulawesi. Looking back, 
we find that many of the Minahasan interpretations insist that the rebellion was 
primarily about reforming a system of governance skewed towards Java. But the 
narratives of other groups, like the Gorontalo, tend to identify the Minahasa and their 
rebellion—rather than Jakarta—as the most notable threats during this period.
49 Barbara S. Harvey, Permesta: Haifa Rebellion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1977), p. 3.
50 Permesta was part of a larger uprising that should be understood in the context of Outer Island 
resentment of Java's perceived economic and political dominance. Permesta joined up with another 
rebellion on Sumatra island called PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or the 
Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic). Their alliance was dubbed PRRI-Permesta. 
Though the two movements were separately motivated, they saw benefits in cooperation.
51 In 1960, through Presidential Regulation no. 5 of that year, Sulawesi was divided into two provinces, 
and later that year assigned the status of an autonomous region. See J. D. Legge, Central Authority and 
Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950-1960 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1961), p. 68. The formation of a new province may have been one of the key negotiating points and a 
way for the central government to divide the insurgents and conquer the rebellion.
52 See, for example, reports of resentment against residents of Bolaang-Mondondow in Harvey, Permesta: 
Haifa Rebellion, p. 120.
53 Niode, Gorontalo: Perubahan Nilai-Nilai Budaya, Pranata Sosial dan Ideologi Lokal, p. 68.
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New Order Rehabilitation
After the failure of the rebellion, the main leaders were captured and flown to 
Jakarta, where they were jailed. However, the fall of Sukarno and the ascendancy of 
Suharto and the New Order improved the rebel leaders' fortunes markedly. After 
taking office, Suharto pardoned many of the key figures of Permesta and then brought 
them into his patronage network. Many found development and consulting jobs, 
including Ventje Sumual, a Minahasan Christian and the leader of the Permesta 
movement. Sumual established a company called P. T. Konsultasi and worked on 
lucrative development projects doled out by the Suharto regime.54
At one level, Suharto may have let Sumual and other leaders of Permesta off the 
hook for personal reasons. He and key Permesta leaders were apparently old friends 
who had fought side by side against the Dutch during the Indonesian revolution. At 
the same time, Permesta's anti-communist and anti-Sukarno ideology were closely in 
line with the New Order's own logic and thus may well have formed the basis for the 
rehabilitation of this cohort. The New Order had emerged in the context of an alleged 
coup and countercoup that had led to anti-communist massacres in 1965. Those events 
had left a smaller imprint on North Sulawesi, in part because the Christian population 
in Manado was largely hostile to communism as an ideology, and because the 
experience of Permesta had also wiped out much of the leftist influences in the region. 
By the 1980s and early 1990s, some were attempting to reinterpret Permesta as an anti­
communist rebellion rather than an anti-government or anti-Indonesian rebellion.55 56
This partial rehabilitation of a rebel force that had challenged the central 
government exacerbated tensions between different ethnic groups within the 
administrative boundaries of North Sulawesi. It appeared that the Minahasans had 
been forgiven and regained their political dominance under the New Order. Back in 
Manado, ethnic Minahasans retained the governorship over the long term, while 
Javanese generals rotated in and out of the governor's office in other provinces (see 
Table 4).56 Minahasans also tended to dominate the bureaucracy and military 
disproportionately. Within the military, access to development funds (keuangan 
pembangunan) meant officers generally enjoyed informal privileges and often held 
personal financial stakes in infrastructure development projects.57 Thus military 
patronage and corruption were perceived to have a Minahasan bias.
Politically, to be sure, some power-sharing arrangements did exist. The vice 
governor, or the head of the provincial legislature, was usually from Bolaang- 
Mongondow or Gorontalo or Sangir—that is, not Minahasan. In addition, there were 
attempts on the part of the provincial government to mitigate the ethnic tensions. 
During the New Order, government leaders promoted the idea of "BOHUSAMI," an 
acronym referring to the four different groups in the province at that time: Bolaang- 
Mongondow, Gorontalo (Hulontalo),58 Sangir/Talaud, and Minahasa.59 This was an
54 B.E. Matindas and Bert Supit, Ventje Sumual, Menatap Hanya Kedepan (Jakarta: Bina Insani, 1998), p. 369.
55 R. Z. Leirissa, PRRI, Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama 
Grafiti, 1991).
56 One informant suggested that the Minahasa may have been enabled to hold onto the governorship 
because the military at the time was heavily Christian.
57 Schouten, Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society, p. 221.
58 An indigenous pronunciation.
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attempt to create a "trans-ethnic" regional identity, one of the priorities of the New 
Order government.59 60But these kinds of efforts tended to ring hollow, particularly when 
one saw that Manado's political structure granted so much power to the Minahasa.
By the 1990s, many non-Minahasa were venting their frustrations. Politically, many 
Gorontalo resented the fact that, although they had the largest population and the 
largest land area, Minahasans occupied most of the key positions in government. At 
Jalan Roda, a local watering hole for politicians in Manado, discontented patrons were 
often heard to gripe that "no matter how good the gubernatorial candidates from other 
ethnic groups might be, they can never compete with the Minahasa."61 62
Table 4: Governors of North Sulawesi, 1961-2005
Name of Governor Years in Office Ethnicity
A. A. Baramuli SH 1961-1962 Sangir / Makassar
F. J. Tumbelaka 1962-1965 Minahasa
Sunandar Prijosoedarmo (interim) 1966 Java
Abdullah Amu (i uteri m) 1966-1967 not recorded
H. V. Worang 1967-1978 Minahasa
Willy Lasut 1978-1979 Minahasa
Erman Harirustaman 1979-1980 not recorded
G. H. Mantik 1980-1985 Minahasa
C. J. Rantung 1985-1995 Minahasa
E. E. Mangindaan 1995-2000 Minahasa
A. J. Sondakh 2000-2005 Minahasa
H. Sarundayang 2005 Minahasa
Source: Hasil Karya1"
And because the Minahasa historically have been economically much better off 
relative to the Gorontalo, the Gorontalo tended to blame neglect by North Sulawesi's 
provincial government for their own underdevelopment. Gorontalo informants 
complained that development funds dispersed to Gorontalo often did not reach their 
area because the money was redirected by the provincial government to development 
projects in Minahasa. One respondent said of the situation, "Gorontalo is an area that is 
always treated as a step-child [anak tiri]."63
59 See David Henley, Maria J. C. Schouten, and Alex Ulaen, "Preserving the Peace in Post-new Order 
Minahasa in Renegotiating Boundaries," in Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. Henk S. Nordholt 
and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV, 2007), p. 323.
60 Michael Jacobsen, "Nation-making and the Politicisation of Ethnicity in Post-Suharto Indonesia," City 
University of Hong Kong, Southeast Asia Research Center, Working Paper Series No. 26 (May 2002), p. S.
1,1 See Kementerian Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, Sejarah Proses Desentralisasi di Propinsi Sulawesi Utara 
(Manado: Kementerian Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, 2003).
62 Provincial Government Report, "Hasil Karya: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi 
Utara Periode 1999-2004 Era Reformasi dan Otonomi Daerah" (Manado, 2004).
63 "Gorontalo itu, daerah yang selalu dianaktirikan." Interview, Saiful Ngiu, staff, Ministry of Sport, 
Jakarta, December 15, 2004. Saiful Ngiu is a native of Gorontalo. See also, "32 Tahun Gorontalo 'Anak 
Tiri,'" Harian Gorontalo, October 20, 2000.
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Table 5: Social Development Indicators I in North Sulawesi
Name Primary School Completion Rate High School Completion Rate
Minahasa 75.2 19.8
Gorontalo 57.3 8.8
Source: Gavin and Sondakh64
Table 6: Social Development Indicators II in North Sulawesi
Name % > 50 meter^ 
floor space
with private 
toilet
% owning stoves % owning 
TVs
Minahasa 31.4 62.1 60.8 33.9
Gorontalo 25.2 26.6 37.4 15.0
Source: Gavin and Sondakh65
Marginality in the Periphery
The drive to separate Gorontalo from North Sulawesi was thus motivated, in part, 
by a feeling of marginalization, engendered by the perception that the province was 
dominated by the Minahasa.64 56 The advantages enjoyed by the Minahasa were 
particularly irksome to the Gorontalo, who saw themselves as having been loyal to the 
Indonesian nation during a time when the Minahasan relationship with the Indonesian 
nation was troubled. To be sure, even the Minahasans' own position in the Indonesian 
state was largely peripheral during the New Order era, as this ethnic group never fully 
regained the status it had enjoyed under the Dutch. But in North Sulawesi province, 
they controlled the economic and political institutions. The campaign to form a new 
province was an attempt by the Gorontalo to break away from a Minahasa-dominated 
province. This historical context shows how resentment between different groups in 
North Sulawesi was created, persisted, and, in fact, intensified during the course of 
Indonesian state-building and well into the New Order.
Transition and Opportunity for Gorontalo
The historical process of state centralization in North Sulawesi fed the growing 
frustration of the Gorontalo. But that frustration lay latent until triggered by 
Indonesia's political turmoil in the late 1990s. Political transition accelerated the call for 
a new Gorontalo province for two reasons. First, the national crisis weakened the 
central government's capacity to govern. Increasing disaffection with the New Order 
and the weakness of the central state during the economic crisis led to bolder initiatives
64 Compiled from Lucky Sondakh and Gavin Jones, "An Economic Survey of Northern Sulawesi: Turning 
Weaknesses into Strengths under Regional Autonomy," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 39,3 
(December 2003): 273-302.
65 Ibid.
66 Even the Ministry of Culture and Tourism recognizes this when it notes in a publication that 
"Throughout the colonial era, the Minahasans had a special position under the Dutch and had the highest 
education and were the most advanced. But in more modern times, reflecting on the slogan of 
BOHUSAMI, political elites from other communities started to ask when it was going to be their turn." See 
ibid.
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by regional actors. At the same time, the institutional changes that emerged in the 
wake of the political transition also provided incentives for political elites. The 
following sections examine both of these processes and how they served to facilitate 
alliances among groups with a shared interest in seeing the establishment of a new 
Gorontalo province.
Gorontalo as a Social Cause
The timing of new-province movements in Indonesia can be understood in the 
context of an opportune political environment.67The collapse of the New Order proved 
to be a critical juncture that unleashed new kinds of political and economic demands.68 
Thus, Gorontalo's initiative can be understood in the framework of other regional 
movements that emerged during the late 1990s. These included the separatist 
movements in East Timor, West Papua, and Aceh, mentioned earlier, but also reform 
movements in resource-rich areas such as Riau and Kalimantan, where residents 
demanded more autonomy and insisted that a greater share of the revenues earned 
through sales of regional commodities must remain in those regions.
As early as 1996, students in Gorontalo district had begun forming discussion 
groups that met regularly to address themes such as democracy, "national success," 
balancing national power (limitation of powers), civil society, and economic 
development.69 In the political turmoil of 1997 and 1998, these discussion groups 
morphed into sites of political organization and activism. The reformasi movement 
grew and spread throughout the archipelago in part because many of the students 
studying in Jakarta returned to their home towns (pulang kampung), joined the local 
movements there, and took to the streets. In Gorontalo, the emerging student 
movement adopted the slogan "Dulowo Limo Lo Pohalala,” or "Two from Five that are 
Brothers," referring to the different subethnic groups that together form the larger 
Gorontalo ethnic family.70
Initially, student demonstrations and demands in Gorontalo mirrored the broader 
student movement nationwide. They raised issues such as inflation, the distribution of 
foodstuffs, and economic security. In 1998, local newspapers also began running 
stories on the corrupt practices of the Gorontalo district chief, Imam Nooriman. 
Nooriman was Javanese, a military officer, and a member of the dominant party, 
Golkar. The news stories prompted student organizations to redirect their frustrations 
from the national to local government. The students staged ongoing demonstrations in 
front of the local government house for the next six months, calling on the regent to 
resign. In response, Nooriman summoned the military and police to break up the
67 In the social-movements literature, this is referred to as the "political opportunity" approach to 
understanding movements. See Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention: 
Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
68 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004).
69 Niode, Gorontalo: Perubahan Nilai-Nilai Budaya, Pranata Sosial dan Ideologi Lokal, p. 71.
70 Interview with Jamal Mooduto, former student activist, Bappeda, Gorontalo, July 26, 2005.
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demonstrations with force.71 Over thirty students were hospitalized as a result of the 
ensuing clash.
In ordinary times, such incidents may have ended with that firm act of repression, 
but now the violence marked a turning point in the student movement. The event 
sparked outrage from the students and the broader community, and a wide range of 
civil-society groups issued a demand to then-provincial governor E. E. Magindaan, 
calling for Nooriman to be sacked. The governor met with the students of Gorontalo 
and promised to resolve the issue. He reshuffled the military bureaucracy in the region 
by firing Ali Fatam, chief of the local military depot, and replaced him with an officer 
from Manado. But despite the demands of the Gorontalo, reinforced by a new 
provincial law against corruption, Governor Magindaan did not follow through on his 
promise to hold Nooriman accountable.
This situation aroused widespread resentment against the governor and in essence 
shifted the target of student grievances from the local district to the provincial level 
and to the governor.72The students demanded that either the governor act decisively, 
or face the prospect of a Gorontalo region that would split from North Sulawesi. So 
frustrated were some students that they marched to the Radio Republik Indonesia 
station and declared on-air that if their demands were not respected, they would call 
for Gorontalo to become its own negeri (state), which could have been interpreted as a 
demand for independence either from North Sulawesi or from Indonesia.73 During 
renewed demonstrations in January 1999, students began calling for the establishment 
of a new province of Gorontalo.
In February, students organized a large meeting (Musyawarah Besar, or MUBES) in 
Gorontalo city. MUBES meetings usually occur annually and are opportunities for 
group members to air grievances and address important issues. At this MUBES, 
student organizers officially declared their support for a new province of Gorontalo.74 
This decision proved critical, as it brought together a broad array of student groups 
under the same umbrella, groups motivated to pursue the creation of a new province.75 
In addition to the secular Gorontalo student groups, the Islamic student association in 
Gorontalo also supported the cause. Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) and its local 
branch office in the area took the initiative to organize an open dialogue, or dialog 
terbuka, to promote the idea of establishing a new province.76
It is worth noting that, in the wake of Muslim and Christian violence in Ambon 
and the Malukus, the North Sulawesi region has often been held up, rightfully, as one
71 Ibid.
72 Later, Nooriman, the bupati, stepped down voluntarily.
73 Interview with Jamal Mooduto, former student activist, Bappeda, Gorontalo, July 26, 2005.
74 Interview with Djamaluddin Panna, former secretary, PRESNAS, Gorontalo, July 26, 2005.
75 Groups included Kerukunan Keluarga Indonesia Gorontalo (KKIG), Forum Solidaritas Intelektual Muda 
Indonesia Gorontalo (FSI-MIG), Himpunan Pelajar Mahasiswa Indonesia Gorontalo (HPMIG), Forum 
Komunikasi Mahasiswa Indonesia Tinelo Gorontalo (FK-MITG), Himpunan Pelajar Mahasiswa Indonesia 
Bualemo Gorontalo (HPMIBG), Ikatan Sarjana Gorontalo (ISG), and Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa 
Gorontalo (FKMG). Intim, "Gorontalo Pisah dari Sulut," Intim 62 (December 1999).
76 Interview with Masri Usman, former leader of HMI Gorontalo, Gorontalo, July 28, 2005.
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place that did not experience religious or other identity-related acts of violence.77 While 
this is true, the prominent role of Islamic organizations shows that tensions latent 
within the province did emerge, but manifested themselves in a different kind of way: 
as a demand for provincial separatism. While anti-Christian rhetoric was never used 
publicly to justify the demands for a new, predominantly Muslim, province, religious 
differences clearly played an important role privately in people's desires to have a 
separate province.78
On December 7, 1999, the first official organization with the specific goal of 
promoting the establishment of a new Gorontalo province was formed. Headed by H. 
Natsir Mooduto, the organization was dubbed Panitia Persiapan Pembentukan 
Provinsi Gorontalo Tomini Raya, the Committee to Prepare for the Formation of 
Gorontalo Tomini Raya Province (or P4GTR for short). With the formation of P4GTR, 
the role of the students was folded into the wider movement for a new province. The 
movement supporting the creation of a new province spread to include a broad array 
of groups from Gorontalo society.
Those involved performed a wide array of tasks, including mobilization, education, 
lobbying, and negotiation. Perhaps most importantly, these groups framed the debate 
in a way that identified the Gorontalo as a marginalized group seeking separation from 
a dominant power. The head of HPMIG, Ethon Parman, noted that the Gorontalo 
region should be entitled to half of the regional budget since it occupies half of North 
Sulawesi.79 "That should be 15 billion rupiah out of the 29 billion for North Sulawesi 
province. What we [Gorontalo] receive is only two billion. Obviously, this is 
unequal."80 Aleks Oli'l, head of the forum in Makassar, noted that Manado takes 
advantage of Gorontalo's resources without then taking care of the people in the 
society. "Manado is like a new imperialist in relation to Gorontalo," he stated.81 Still 
others noted that "For dozens of years, Gorontalo has been cow's milk for the people of 
Manado."82
The social mobilization that built support for creating a new Gorontalo province 
was a critical part of the political process. Social forces took advantage of the economic 
and political crisis in Jakarta and advocated for region-specific goals. In particular, the 
demonstrations that emerged shifted the frustrations that had been concerned with 
general national issues to specific localized ones. Furthermore, the violence and the 
subsequent intransigence of local and regional leaders triggered the concrete demand 
for a new province. But the "political opportunity" argument only takes us so far. It
77 See, for example, David Henley, Maria J. C. Schouten, and Alex Ulaen "Preserving the Peace in Post- 
New Order Minahasa," Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, p. 323.
78 Interview with Husein Mohi, journalist, Gorontalo, July 29, 2005.
79 APBD, or the Anggaran Pendapat dan Belanja Daerah, Regional Budget.
80 "Puluhan Mahasiswa Inginkan Propinsi Gorontalo," Kompas, December 7,1999. Note that the budget for 
a Gorontalo province was reported to be as high as 13 billion rupiah. See "APBD Gorontalo Bisa 13 
Milyar," Harian Gorontalo, October 13, 2000.
81 "Manado seperti imperilisme baru terhadap Gorontalo," quoted in "Gorontalo Pisah dari Sulut," Intim 
62 (December 1999).
82 "... selama berpuluh-puluh tahun menjadi sapi perahan bagi masyarakat Manado," quoted in 
"Gorontalo Pisah dari Sulut," Intim 62 (December 1999).
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can help explain the emergence of the movement, but in the case of Gorontalo political 
elites also played a critical role in supporting the initiative for a new province.
Decentralization and Local Elites
While societal groups took the lead in pressing for this initiative, local elites also 
had an interest in the creation of a new province, and thus they often worked alongside 
civil-society organizations to lobby the central government. Local elite interest can be 
understood particularly in the context of decentralization initiatives undertaken by the 
government as part of its political reforms. Two laws, Law 22 of 1999 on Regional 
Administration ("Law 22") and Law 25 of 1999 on Inter-Government Financial Balance 
("Law 25"), devolved almost all substantive power, except in a few key areas (foreign 
affairs, international trade, monetary policy, national security, and legal systems) to the 
regency, a subprovincial level known in Indonesian as the kabupaten.83
The justification for decentralization was largely based on two principles: efficiency 
and equality. In terms of efficiency, decentralization was expected to promote 
governance that was "closer to the ground" and thus inherently more responsive to 
local demands, particularly in social sectors such as health and education.84 It was 
thought that decentralized local governments would have better information and be 
able to act more quickly than the central government. From an economic perspective as 
well, decentralization was said to promote competition among different units because 
firms and individuals would be able to choose where to reside based on the 
performance of a particular municipality. This competition would induce better 
performance.85
Because it would shift power from the center to the periphery, decentralization was 
also seen as a way to quell calls for separatism and/or revolution.86Giving power and 
autonomy to local leaders would mean that the regions would be free from the 
intrusive political machinations of the "Javanese center." At the same time, 
decentralization promised fiscal benefits to the periphery: localities would be able to 
retain more of the revenues generated in their own areas rather than sending them to 
the central government. Thus the sense of justice, the sense that greater equality had 
been established between the center and peripheral areas (as opposed to equality 
among the different peripheral units), was an important consideration for those who 
shaped the decentralization policy.87
83 These laws were implemented in 2001 and were subsequently revised in 2004.
84 See Gustav Ranis and Frances Stewart, "Decentralization in Indonesia," Technical report (Yale 
University, Economic Growth Center, 1995). These authors were early advocates for decentralization 
based on these grounds.
85 The economic logic underlying this perspective is found in Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy 64 (1956): 416-424.
86 See, for example, the discussion by Gabriele Ferrazzi, "Using the 'F' Word: Federalism in Indonesia's 
Decentralization Discourse," Publius 30,2 (Spring 2000): 63-85.
87 It is notable that, for the most part, the reforms granting increased autonomy to the periphery in 
Indonesia focused on administration at the district level rather than the provincial level. This was because 
of the military's strong objections to provincial autonomy, which it feared would accelerate, rather than 
abate, centrifugal forces. Thus, current decentralization law is a compromise of sorts, shaped by pressures
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But the decentralization of power can also have perverse effects. The 
transformation may provide new opportunities in patronage and rent-seeking, for 
example. Michael Malley has suggested that decentralization of power also 
decentralizes and may spread corruption in some places.88 New provinces, then, by 
extension, can also provide new political and economic bailiwicks for opportunistic 
elites. In particular, provinces require start-up infrastructure, including a new 
governor's house, a new legislative house, new bureaucratic offices, and the like, all of 
which provide opportunity for rent-seeking activities. Thus, new provinces also seem 
to generate construction boomlets in the region, filling the pockets of those who control 
contract bids.89
In Gorontalo, two kinds of local elites were active in supporting the movement for 
a new province. The first were prominent figures in society who had political 
aspirations related to the new province. These "out-of-power" or "aspiring" elites 
included prominent educators, religious figures, and business leaders. They lent the 
movement credibility as efforts to lobby and forge alliances became more important. 
These elites were also able to use the newly created civil-society organizations as 
vehicles to promote their own political agendas.90
For example, despite the creation of P4GTR as the primary advocacy vehicle for the 
formation of a new province, other groups such as PRESNAS and KP3GTR also 
emerged.91 The official rationale for having several groups outlined a division of labor: 
P4GTR's activities would be "local," PRESNAS would be "medium size," and KP3GTR 
would lobby in Jakarta. But there was no compelling reason why one organization 
could not operate at different levels. In fact, the situation was determined by a 
leadership conflict among the different organizations because the leaders of each party 
aspired to become governor of a new Gorontalo province.92
Local elites who already held positions of power, such as local district heads and 
members of the district level legislature, also supported the formation of a new 
province. Many of their considerations were electoral. The movement was already 
popular, and to oppose such a movement could have consequences later. At the same 
time, creation of a new province would also funnel more development funds to the 
region, funds that had previously gone to Manado. This would mean increased 
development projects, projects of the kind that typically benefited local elites who 
could profit from fixed bidding and other practices.93The prospect of these benefits led 
the district heads of Sualemo, Gorontalo, and Gorontalo City to show their support at
for increased autonomy and increased freedoms, yet also marked by caution regarding the implications of 
these centrifugal forces for national unity.
88 See Michael Malley, "New Rules, Old Structures, and the Limits of Decentralization," in Local Power and 
Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, ed. Edward Aspinall, Greg Fealy, et al. (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
89 Fitrani et al., "Unity in Diversity?," p. 63.
90 Interview with Husein Mohi, journalist, Gorontalo, July 29, 2005.
91 Komite Pusat Pembentukan Provinsi Gorontalo Tomini Raya or The Central Committee for the 
Formation of Gorontalo Tomini Raya Province.
92 Interview, Nelson Pomalingo, and Roem Kohno, heads of PRESNAS, and KP3GTR respectively. Both 
had clear gubernatorial ambitions. Natsir Mooduto, head of P4GTR had recently passed away.
93 Interview with Rusli Monoarfa, student leader for Gorontalo Province, Manado, July 9, 2005.
Marginality and Opportunity in the Periphery 91
the Patriot Day rally on January 23, 2000. The mayor of Gorontalo City, Medi Botutihe, 
also supported the movement, claiming that he sympathized with the aspirations of 
the local people.94 Botutihe was another local leader who tried to run for governor of 
the new province, but he failed to garner broad support.95
To be sure, some elites were more willing to participate than others. In contrast to 
their counterparts in Gorontalo district, the ethnic Gorontalo elites in the provincial 
legislature did not initially support splitting the province.96 One might expect that such 
leaders would be interested in establishing a new political unit where they could exert 
more power and influence without other groups, like the Minahasa, interfering in their 
affairs. However, elites in their position tended to be risk-averse and conservative. The 
Gorontalo legislators in Manado already had secure positions, and it was not in their 
interest to contest a new election where the outcome would be uncertain. Thus, of eight 
ethnic Gorontalo in Manado, all initially opposed the provincial split.97
The initial reluctance of the provincial elite formed the basis for a coalition opposed 
to the creation of the new province. In addition, ethnic migrants who had relocated to 
the provincial capital in Manado as part of a regional diaspora also expressed 
reservations about a new province. Gorontalo migrants who lived and worked in 
Manado were concerned that they would now be unwelcome in the city based on their 
race and ethnicity;98 they feared being told to "go home to your new province."99 The 
same was true of ethnic minority groups in the proposed new province of Gorontalo. 
Bureaucrats and other public officials from outside the region who served in Gorontalo 
were concerned about facing potential discrimination.
Recognizing the obstacle posed by provincial opposition, pro-Gorontalo forces 
brokered a deal. They agreed that if the legislators supported the recommendation for 
a new province, they would be given seats in the new Gorontalo legislature without 
having to campaign for them in the first election cycle.100 Out of the eight leaders who 
had originally been opposed to splitting the province, seven of them now agreed and 
supported the initiative, while one remained in his seat in Manado. Once the provincial 
leaders were bought off, the remaining opposition receded. There was little 
coordination or any impetus to mobilization among remaining groups inclined to 
oppose the split. Thus, in February, the provincial legislature formally approved the 
division of North Sulawesi province into two parts.101
Throughout this process, the support of elites was critical at both the local and 
provincial levels, as government regulations dictated that before any such initiative 
would be considered at the national level, it must have the support of the local society
94 "Boutihe Tak Takut Dukung 'gtr,'" Manado Post, December 29,1999.
95 "Lemah Lobi, Botutihe Sulit Jadi Gubernur Gorontalo," Harian Gorontalo, September 28, 2000.
96 Interview with Husein Mohi, journalist, Gorontalo, July 29, 2005. Confirmed also by Ismail Moo, 
businessman, supporter of Gorontalo Province, Manado, July 8, 2005.
97 Interview with Paris Yusuf, member DPRD Gorontalo, Gorontalo, July 25, 2005.
98 Rainer Emyot Ointoe, local activist from Gorontalo, Manado, April 3, 2005. See also Reiner Emyot 
Ointoe, "Tomini Raya dan Diaspora Orang Gorontalo," Manado Post, February 7, 2000.
99 Rainer Emyot Ointoe, local activist from Gorontalo, Manado, April 3, 2005.
100 Interview with Husein Mohi, journalist, Gorontalo, July 29, 2005.
101 "DPRD Sulut Setuju Dibentuk Provinsi," Suara Pembaruan, February 13, 2000.
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and the local government. The provincial legislatures and the district chiefs and 
governors functioned as checkpoints on the path to Jakarta.
Political Party Reform and National Elites
Civil-society organizations and political elites in the periphery had clear reasons for 
promoting the establishment of a new province. But what of elites at the national level? 
Why would political elites in the center support a regionalist initiative? On the one 
hand, the politics of personality and patronage played an important role here. 
Gorontalo had strong allies in Jakarta who rallied to the cause. At the same time, the 
transformation of the party system also shaped the interests of the various political 
parties, motivating them to advocate for a new province.
The best known advocate in Jakarta for Gorontalo provincehood was President 
Habibie. Though he had been raised in South Sulawesi, Habibie's family roots are in 
Gorontalo, and he strongly supported the provincial cause based on personal affinity 
to the region.102 He both gave financial support and lobbied on behalf of Gorontalo 
with key leaders in the legislature. General Wiranto, army chief-of-staff under the 
Suharto regime and 2004 presidential candidate for Golkar, was also a strong advocate, 
in part because his wife was a native of Gorontalo.103 Powerful businessmen such as 
Rachmat Gobel, a native of Gorontalo and head of Panasonic Indonesia, also strongly 
supported the new province.
While individual political elites in Jakarta may have had personal interests in 
creating a new province, national-level legislators had clear material incentives in 
advocating for a new province. It is an open secret that new provinces and new 
districts often require bribes paid to the national-level legislators who are ultimately 
the ones to write the law that establishes the fledgling administrative unit (a law that 
must then be signed by the president). Lobbyists' visits to legislators are then as much 
about distributing money as they are about presenting convincing arguments. In the 
case of Gorontalo, relevant legislators were apparently paid a sum of five million 
rupiah each in exchange for their support of the bill.104
But the monetary incentives paid to individual legislators were not the only factors 
influencing policy at the national level. Political parties as institutions played a critical 
role in new-province formation since approval for such an action requires legislative 
consent. Here it is useful to elaborate on some aspects of party reform. The tightly 
controlled process of party formation under the New Order was loosened up 
considerably under reformasi. Under the new rules, only fifty signatures from citizens 
twenty-one years of age or older, and registration with a court and the Ministry of
102 In general, Habibie was seen as an advocate for "Outer Island" Indonesia after he replaced Suharto as 
president.
103 Note that this took place when the army still held a block of seats in the national legislature. Some 
suggest that Wiranto may have even been the one to broach the subject in the legislature. Interview with 
Pitres Sombowadile, activist, February 4, 2005.
104 An informant, who was present at the time the bribes were paid, emphasized that five million was quite 
a small sum, in part because Gorontalo was such an uncontentious case. He claimed that Gorontalo was 
the cheapest, fastest, smoothest of all the new-province initiatives and that others were more expensive or 
fraught with complications.
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Justice, were required to form a new party.105 As a result, dozens of new political 
parties emerged in 1999.
At the same time, stringent rules about which parties could contest national 
elections prevented the emergence of regional or ethnic-based political parties. The 
rules dictated that, in order to qualify to run in the 1999 national elections, parties were 
required to have offices established in at least one-third of Indonesia's provinces and at 
least half of all districts in those provinces.106These rules had an enormous influence on 
the composition of legislative bodies.
In addition, the election reform committee came up with a formula to balance 
representation between Java and the Outer Islands. Therefore, although 60 percent of 
Indonesia's population lived on Java, legislative seats were divided nearly evenly, with 
234 (50.6 percent) for Java and 228 (49.4 percent) for the Outer Islands. Seats were 
distributed to cities with more than 450,000 people first. The remaining seats were 
allocated among the provinces based on population.107 For example, in the densely 
populated province of East Java, a candidate needed 287,199 votes to win a seat on the 
legislature. A seat from Irian Jaya (West Papua), in contrast, would require only 63,547 
votes.108 Thus, in the 1999 elections, Megawati Sukarnoputeri's PDI-P (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) won 
34 percent of the votes and received 33 percent of the seats (153) because many of its 
votes were concentrated on Java. In contrast, Golkar won 22 percent of the votes but 
received 26 percent of the seats because many of its votes were from the Outer 
Islands.109Other parties faced more or less similar kinds of disparities, gaining or losing 
advantage depending on where their votes originated.
Given this context, new-province formation in Gorontalo and elsewhere may have 
been part of a longer term strategy to increase the number of seats in the legislature 
through the creation of new provinces. In 1999, electoral districts were organized along 
provincial lines, and thus the creation of a new province effectively meant that broad- 
based parties could gain more representation in the DPR-RI (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat-Republik Indonesia, People's Representative Assembly of the Republic of 
Indonesia or The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia). 110The largest 
parties, including PDI-P and Golkar, may have seen this as an opportunity to 
consolidate their dominant position in the national legislature and keep open the 
possibility of a cross-party alliance. At the same time, the requirement that parties 
maintain offices in at least a third of all provinces also gave larger parties an 
advantage, making it harder for small parties to compete.
105 Dwight King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 51.
106 Ibid.
107 Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2002), p. 89.
108 Ibid.
109 Stephen Sherlock, "The 2004 Indonesian Elections: How the System Works and What the Parties Stand 
For: A Report on Political Parties," technical report (Australian National University, 2004), p. 8.
110 This point was suggested to me in various interviews, but I could not confirm through party officials or 
other participants that it had been an intentional strategy. Furthermore, by 2004, the laws governing 
electoral districts changed so that they were no longer based solely on provincial boundaries.
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What is clear from the Gorontalo experience is that supporting a new province also 
gave central elites in Golkar a great deal of influence over the future of its provincial 
leadership. Prior to 2004, the governor was elected by the province's legislature. In 
Gorontalo, Golkar dominated the legislature and controlled the outcome of the 
gubernatorial election.111 Because parties remained highly centralized, local legislators 
in Gorontalo were put under heavy pressure to elect Fadel Mohammed, a candidate 
chosen by the national Golkar party. Mohammed was Muslim, but not a putra daerah, 
or "son of the soil." Though he had spent some time in the region, his roots were in 
Ternate, and he lived and worked in Jakarta. But he had been a high-ranking and 
influential member of Golkar. Previously a businessman, Mohammed had risen 
through the ranks and established close ties with the Golkar leadership. His election 
dismayed the students and other local activists who insisted the ethnic Gorontalo take 
care of their own political future by electing one of their own. In this sense, national 
elites benefited from a new Gorontalo province mediated through political parties.
In sum, a strong national party seeking to maintain its legislative dominance had 
incentives to carve out provinces that would provide electoral gains at the national 
level. In addition, support from powerful patrons in Jakarta significantly aided in 
Gorontalo's cause. The role of central elites would also form a point of conflict among 
the local societal groups that had supported the creation of a new province for very 
different motives. However, this rift would emerge only after a new province was 
already created.
Reflections and Conclusions
This article has tried to demonstrate the starkly political nature of new-province 
formation in Indonesia by examining the experience of Gorontalo. In Gorontalo, 
perceptions of historical marginalization led to popular resentment of Minahasan 
dominance. That dominance had emerged from the process by which the Dutch and 
Indonesian states sought to incorporate far-flung regions of the archipelago into an 
administratively coherent state. Gorontalo's opportunity to split away from North 
Sulawesi grew out of the political turmoil in the late 1990s and the subsequent 
institutional changes to Indonesia's political system. These provided the foundations 
for an alliance between social actors and elite actors spanning local, regional, and 
national levels.
Over a long span of time—through the colonial period, the nationalist era, the era 
of regional rebellion, and the New Order—the relationship between North Sulawesi 
and the state created tensions between the Minahasans and the Gorontalo. Both the 
colonial and Indonesian central state tended to privilege the Minahasa over the 
Gorontalo via the administrative structures of North Sulawesi province. These 
conditions left North Sulawesi compartmentalized ethnically and religiously.
111 Gorontalo has historically been a stronghold for Golkar. At the provincial level, out of 25 members, 13 
were from Golkar, 2 from PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party), 1 from PDI-P, 1 from 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, 1 from Partai Bulan Bintang, 4 from PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the Unity 
Development Party), and 3 from TNI/Polri (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/Polisi Republik Indonesia) the 
armed forces and national police party). Niode, Gorontalo: Perubahan Nilai-Nilai Budaya, Pranata Sosial dan 
Ideologi Lokal, p. 72.
Marginality and Opportunity in the Periphery 95
The timing of Gorontalo's provincial movement can be attributed, in part, to the 
Indonesian financial crisis of 1997, the collapse of Suharto's government, and 
subsequent political reforms in Indonesia. The students' demands for a new province 
emerged from localized events that occurred in the context of the national reformasi 
movement. Students vented their frustrations against North Sulawesi's governor for 
refusing to hold local leaders accountable for violence and corruption. As it happened, 
the interests of these social reformers overlapped with the interests of elites at the local, 
regional, and national levels to such a degree that, once initiated, the process moved 
quickly and smoothly.
A key implication of this study is that, in the context of center-region ties, the 
process of new-province formation is closely connected to national politics. The road to 
creating a new province is paved through Jakarta. Initially, national elite support for 
such regional objectives and ambitions may seem puzzling, but if examined in relation 
to political institutions, especially the larger political parties that might gain legislative 
seats and regional influence through such initiatives, the motives of national elites 
became much more clear. This is critical because the ultimate decision for or against a 
new province rests on their approval.
This insight also suggests that the relationship between center and regions in 
Indonesia is more complex than is typically portrayed. In Gorontalo, the movement to 
institute a new province was not about severing relations with the central state, but 
rather about creating new ties and new relationships previously not possible when the 
area was subsumed under North Sulawesi's larger provincial administrative structure. 
In this sense, a new Gorontalo province was less about a region seeking to isolate itself 
from the state and more about new and different kinds of access and relationships 
between center and region. In other words, there seems to be a centripetal element to 
new-province formation. It is clear that power does not flow in one direction, from the 
center outward, in Indonesia today. Relations between the nation's political center and 
its periphery are fragmented and multi-directional, a condition that political actors at 
all levels are learning to negotiate.
